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Capital formation, economic growth and stability depend on investor confi-
dence in the fairness and integrity of the capital markets. The U.S. securities
markets generally are liquid, efficient, and fair. The prices of the vast majority
of actively traded securities reflect available public information concerning
companies and the economy [1]. In recent years, however, insider trading has
been viewed as a significant threat to the fairness and integrity of the U.S.
securities markets.
Insider trading refers to the practice of trading in the securities markets by
those in possession of material nonpublic information. Corporate officers and
other corporate insiders, as well as persons who obtain nonpublic information
(" tippees"), can reap large profits by purchasing or selling securities prior to
the announcements of important corporate events. Neither the Securities Act
of 1933 [2] nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [3] (the "Exchange Act")
provides a direct prohibition against insider trading. The courts and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") have attacked insider trading
through section 10(b) [4] of the Exchange Act, a general antifraud provision,
and through rule 10b-5 [5], adopted by the SEC under its rulemaking author-
ity.
The prevention of insider trading has become one of the SEC's major
enforcement goals [6]. In 1983, the SEC filed twenty-four insider trading cases,
twice as many as two years earlier [7]. The SEC also has attempted to prevent
those trading on material nonpublic information from retaining anonymity by
trading through a foreign financial institution. In many countries those institu-
tions are legally obligated not to divulge the trader's name because of relevant
bank secrecy or blocking legislation [8].
In contrast to the efforts of the SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited
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the efficacy of using section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to combat insider trading. In
Chiarella v. United States [9] and Dirks v. SEC [10], the Supreme Court
rejected the "market information" theory, which posits that a person engages
in insider trading whenever he trades on the basis of material nonpublic
information [11]. Instead, the Court adopted the "fiduciary duty" theory under
which the basis of liability for insider trading is the insider's violation of a duty
owed to one of the parties related to the transaction [12]. This contrast between
the SEC's enforcement efforts and the Chiarella and Dirks decisions has
created uncertainty as to whether outsiders who trade on the basis of material
nonpublic information engage in insider trading or merely use lawfully at-
tained knowledge in making their investment decisions.
Congress is presently considering the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983
[13], which amends the Exchange Act and is designed to deter insider trading
by increasing the civil and criminal penalties for violations. The legislation, as
presently drafted, does not include a definition of insider trading. Rather, the
scope of insider trading would continue to be defined by the fiduciary duty
analysis adopted by the Supreme Court under rule 10b-5.
This comment argues that while section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have proved
adequate for prosecuting cases involving corporate insiders, they are inap-
propriate for prosecuting cases involving "outsider trading" where the trader
owes no fiduciary duty to the shareholder even though he has traded on
material nonpublic information [14]. In order to provide market participants,
the courts and the SEC with a clear standard for determining outsider liability,
Congress should include a definition of insider trading in the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1983. This definition should not be based on the present
fiduciary duty theory but on the "market information" theory.
In 1980, England adopted a comprehensive insider trading statute as part of
the Companies Act of 1980 [15]. This Act incorporates a definition of insider
trading based on the market information theory. Under this statute, an insider
or a tippee is prohibited from using material nonpublic information regarding
a specific company obtained from a person knowingly connected with that
company. Only one case has been decided under the Companies Act, and there
are ambiguities in the statute that need to be resolved by the British courts.
Congress, however, can use this statute as an example in formulating an
American definition of insider trading, avoiding its weaknesses but adopting
the market information approach which it incorporates.
2. The proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983
2.1. Purpose and contents
The proposed legislation would increase the alternative enforcement remed-
ies which the SEC may use against those engaging in insider trading. In its
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report accompanying the bill, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
stated that additional legislation was necessary because the existing remedies
have proved inadequate to deter violations and because there is a public
perception that the risk of detection is slight. Changes in the markets, such as
the introduction of new financial instruments and the proliferation of tender
offers and proxy contests, have necessitated additional SEC enforcement tools
and remedial actions. The SEC also needs added flexibility to mold the remedy
to the egregiousness of the violation [16].
The proposed legislation would amend section 21(d) [17] of the Securities
Exchange Act by creating a new section 21(d) (2) as follows:
(A) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any provision of this
title or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of
material nonpublic information in a transaction (i) on or through the facilities of a national
securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and (ii) which is not part of a public
offering by an issuer of securities other than standardized options, the Commission may bring an
action in a United States District Court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to impose a
civil penalty to be paid by such person, or any person aiding and abetting the violation of such
person. The amount of such penalty shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and
circumstances, but shall not exceed three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such
unlawful purchase or sale, and shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States. The actions
authorized by this paragraph may be brought in addition to any other actions that the Commission
or the Attorney General are entitled to bring [18].
The SEC would be permitted to use the new remedy in addition to existing
ones, so that in appropriate cases the SEC may seek: (1) a court order
enjoining the violator from breaking the law again; (2) disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains which may, if appropriate, be paid into an escrow fund so that
traders or other private parties damaged by the insider trading can obtain
compensation for their losses; and (3) the imposition of the new civil money
penalty payable to the U.S. Treasury [19].
Additionally, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act would amend section 32(c)
[201 to increase the potential criminal fine from $10,000 to $100,000. The fine
was enacted in 1934 and has never been increased, so that inflation has eroded
its deterrent effect.
2.2. Inclusion of a definition of insider trading
A major point of controversy concerning the Insider Trading Sanctions Act
is whether a statutory definition of insider trading is desirable. The present text
of the Act does not include such a defintion, even though many experts have
advocated one [21]. The Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
heard the testimony of many securities experts on this question during its
hearings on the bill and looked to the SEC for guidance.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
M. Karsch / The Insider Trading Sanctions Act
A.A. Sommer, Jr., a former SEC Commissioner, expressed his strong
opposition to the inclusion of a definition. He stated that the SEC has wisely
ignored repeated complaints that the standards are too vague and uncertain,
believing that there are situations in which the best rulemaking is through
litigation. Although this course is often more protracted, it results in standards
that reflect the complexities of actual cases, standards that constantly mature
to reflect changed ways of doing business, new problems, and innovative
schemes to avoid or thwart the law [22]. Adoption of a specific definition
would require Congress to maintain a continuing vigilance to assure that the
statute did not inadvertently become an opportunity for wrongdoing rather
than a deterrent [23].
In a letter dated 29 June, 1983, SEC Chairman John Shad articulated the
following SEC position opposing the inclusion of a defintion of insider trading
in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act:
[E]xisting law provides a sound legal framework for judicial analysis and review of new and
unforeseeable trading devices and strategies. Decades of legal thinking have contributed to the
development of existing antifraud law under rule 10b-5. The Commission is opposed to abandon-
ing those principles for an untried definition of insider trading. Any definition would incorporate
new terms and concepts which would have to be interpreted in subsequent litigation. Thus, a
definition would not provide the clarity sought; to the contrary, it would inevitably create new
uncertainties [24].
The House Committee, in its report to the House recommending passage of
the Act, adopted the SEC position. The Committee believed that the law with
respect to insider trading is sufficiently well developed to provide adequate
guidance. It also believed that the SEC has used its broad rulemaking authority
to respond to market developments and that any new definition would tend to
create new ambiguities which would increase rather than limit uncertainty [25].
The Committee also cited the conclusions of the drafters of the proposed
Federal Securities Code [26] that hard-core insider trading only could be
"vaguely defined" [27]. The drafters believed that all other types of questiona-
ble conduct involving illicit misappropriation of market and insider informa-
tion should be left to the courts, which should determine whether the particular
conduct amounts to a "fraudulent act" or a "misrepresentation" [28]. They
concluded that "this area must be left to further judicial development" [29).
Furthermore, the Committee believed that Dirks, because of its unique
facts, would not affect the SEC's ability to pursue insider trading cases as long
as the opinion was "properly and narrowly construed by the courts" [30]. Soon
after the decision was rendered, SEC officials reported that a review of the
thirty-four insider trading cases brought by the SEC in the past two years
revealed that only one case might have been affected by Dirks [31]. Neverthe-
less, the Committee directed the SEC to monitor closely the effects of Dirks for
at least two years because the ultimate impact of the case depends on future
judicial interpretations.
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The Hearings and Report of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce indicate that both the Committee and the SEC opposed the inclusion of
a definition of insider trading in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. Although
proposed section 21(d)(2)(A) could be read to replace the fiduciary duty theory
with the market information theory by its use of the language "while in
possession of material nonpublic information", the House Committee and the
SEC both took the position that the outermost contours of insider trading still
should be defined by the case law under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 [32].
3. The insider trading cases under rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) and the rulemaking provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 give the SEC broad powers to regulate the securities markets. Although
the language of rule 10b-5 does not specifically prohibit insider trading, the
SEC and the courts have liberally construed the broad antifraud language in
sections (a) and (c) of the rule to regulate that activity [33].
The initial cases decided under rule 10b-5 analyzed insider trading as fraud
in the traditional sense. These cases dealt with corporate insiders - officers,
directors or employees - who had breached their fiduciary duty to investors or
had deceived them by trading on inside information or by disclosing that
information solely for the purpose of utilizing that information [34]. The scope
of the rule was eventually extended to penalize certain outsiders, such as
underwriters, attorneys, bankers, and brokers who had misused material non-
public information. Such an extension was consistent with earlier cases because
these outsiders were deemed to have entered into a fiduciary relationship with
the corporation and its shareholders and, accordingly, were treated as if they
were insiders [35].
The SEC believed that outsider trading was as much an evil as insider
trading. Eventually, it brought cases against outsiders who traded while in
possession of material nonpublic information, whether or not they had entered
into a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and its shareholders [36]. The
SEC sought to bring all outsider trading within the scope of rule 10b-5 by
adopting the position that anyone in possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion has a duty to either disclose it to the investing public or abstain from
trading or tipping. Failure to comply with the "disclose-or-abstain" rule
constituted fraud for the purposes of rule 10b-5. Many lower courts approved
the SEC position on the basis that it supported the "justifiable expectation of
the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information" [37].
The development of rule 10b-5 as a broad enforcement mechanism against
outsider trading has run into strong resistance from the Supreme Court. In
Chiarella v. United States [38], the Court held that nondisclosure of inside
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information is actionable as fraud under rule 10b-5 only where there is a duty
to disclose or abstain arising "from a relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties to a transaction" [39]. Chiarella was employed by a
financial printer engaged in printing tender offer documents for certain
companies planning takeover bids. Although the acquiring and target compa-
nies' names were omitted from the documents until the final printing, Chiarella
deduced the identities of the target companies, purchased shares of the targets
anticipating that the share prices would rise once the offer was announced, and
sold the shares at a profit after the announcement [40]. His actions did not
constitute a violation of rule lOb-5 because the requisite duty had not arisen.
In response to the Chiarella decision, the SEC promulgated rule 14e-3 [41]
to prohibit insider trading in the specific context of tender offers. This rule,
adopted under the antifraud provision of section 14 [42], was designed to
circumvent the specific holding of Chiarella [431. It is unclear, however,
whether the SEC's statutory authority extends to transactions entered into
prior to the actual making of a tender offer [44]. Thus, the applicability of rule
14e-3 to Chiarella-type activities remains uncertain.
In Chiarella, the Court refused to consider the "misappropriation theory"
because it was not raised at the trial level [451. In United States v. Newman [46],
the Second Circuit found that the tippers had a duty to their employers and
the employers' clients not to misappropriate, for their personal benefit, infor-
mation entrusted to the employers by the clients. The breach of that duty
resulted in liability for both the tippers and tippees [47]. This case is significant
because the court found liability even though there was no violation of a
fiduciary duty as defined by Chiarella. The court, in effect, expalded the duty
to Newman's employer and the employer's clients. While the opinion has been
subject to criticism [48], the SEC scored a major victory in winning a criminal
conviction for outsider trading.
In O'Conner & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. [49], the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York concluded that an insider
owes a general duty to the marketplace not to trade on nonpublic information
obtained through a breach of duty. O'Conner, an options trading firm, sued
several companies alleging that unknown insiders had given inside information
regarding a takeover bid to Dean Witter, who then purchased stock options for
customers and themselves at the same time that the plantiff was selling its
options. Citing Newman, the court held that a breach of fiduciary duty owed to
any party constitutes a fraudulent practice [50]. This holding, however, seemed
to ignore the Supreme Court's rejection of the Second Circuit's "general duty
to the public" holding in Chiarella [51].
In Dirks v. SEC [52], the Supreme Court demonstrated its continued
adherence to the fiduciary duty standard when it reversed the SEC's censure of
Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst instrumental in exposing the Equity
Funding fraud. Dirks was charged by the SEC with violating section 10(b) for
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investigating rumors of fraud, discovering from employees of Equity Funding
that the allegations were true, and divulging the results of his investigation to
clients of his firm who then sold their holdings prior to public disclosure [531.
The Dirks court concluded that in some cases an outsider tippee can become
derivatively bound to his tipper's fiduciary duty to disclose his information or
abstain from trading. This duty, first enunciated in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.
[54], attaches when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation by disclosing inside information and the tippee knows
or should know that there has been such a breach. An insider violates his Cady,
Roberts duty to disclose or abstain only when he will personally benefit, either
directly or indirectly, from the use of the confidential information [55].
Applying this new test of tippee liability, the court concluded that Dirks had
not committed any actionable wrong because, as an outsider, he could be liable
only by extension of the duty of his tippers [56]. The court found that the
tipper derived no personal gain from tipping Dirks so that Dirks acquired no
derivative duty to disclose [571.
Only weeks after Dirks was decided, the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California articulated the "temporary insider" doctrine in SEC v.
Lund [58]. Lund had purchased stock after receiving nonpublic information
from a corporate insider. The court concluded that the insider had not
breached his fiduciary duty because the information was disclosed for the
legitimate corporate purpose of a possible investment in a new venture and
because disclosure was within the scope of his authority as an officer of the
corporation. Consequently, Lund was not liable as a tippee [59]. The court,
however, found that Lund had violated rule 10b-5. It focused on footnote 14 of
Dirks [60], which stated that corporate outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders when corporate information is revealed legitimately to them
because they have entered into a special .confidential relationship in the
conduct of the enterprise. For such a duty to be imposed, however, the
corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic informa-
tion confidential [611. The court concluded that Lund was a "temporary
insider" and was subject to the insider's duty to disclose or abstain.
4. Incorporation of a market information definition of insider trading into the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act
4.1. The lOb-5 cases do not provide predictable standards of liability
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the courts and the SEC
generally believed that the prohibition of insider trading was predicated on the
market information approach [62]. Chiarella and Dirks narrowed the definition
of illegal trading on inside information by favoring the fiduciary duty ap-
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proach. An analysis of the post-Chiarella cases under rule 10b-5 indicates that
the fiduciary duty approach is ambiguous and subject to manipulation by the
courts. As such, it provides little guidance as to the outermost contours of
illegal insider trading.
The Lund case demonstrates the SEC's latest enforcement tool, the "con-
structive insider" theory. In Dirks, the Supreme Court had held that absent a
breach of duty by the tipper there cannot be a violation of section 10(b) [631.
Lund was convicted, even though the court found that there was no breach of
duty by the tipper and thus no derivative breach by Lund [64]. The court
manipulated the duty analysis to hold that Lund was a "temporary insider"
subject to the same duty to disclose or abstain as an insider.
Another example of the lower courts' manipulation of the duty analysis is
demonstrated by SEC v. Musella [65], a pending case where various people,
including the office manager of a New York law firm, traded on tips passed by
the office manager who was privy to the takeover plans of the firm's clients. In
a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court noted the distinction
between shareholders of the corporations from which the nonpublic informa-
tion emanated and those of the corporations in which the defendants traded:
The rather anomalous result of Chiarella, at least from a policy perspective, is that an individual
who obtains nonpublic information regarding a tender offer from the acquiring company, rather
than the target company, is not subject to liability, if he or she chooses to capitalize on this
information by trading in the target company's securities [66.
The court thus found that just as Chiarella had no fiduciary duty, neither did
the office manager. The court held instead that he had a duty similar to
Newman, based on his common law duty of silence owed to his employer. By
following this "commonsensical view that trading on the basis of improperly
obtained information is fundamentally unfair", the court, in effect, held that
distinctions premised on the source of the information underlying the pro-
phylatic intent of the securities laws should not be allowed [67].
Another ambiguity in the law is exhibited in a classic insider trading
hypothetical [68]. An outsider overhears two corporate insiders discussing
nonpublic price-sensitive information at a restaurant or at a sporting event.
The two insiders neither know nor have reason to know that an outsider is
overhearing their conversation, which is being held for legitimate purposes. If
the outsider trades on this information, has he violated rule 10b-5?
An examination of the two sentences of footnote 12 of Chiarella gives
conflicting results. The footnote reads:
Tippees of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they have a duty not to
profit from the use of inside information that they know is confidential and know or should know
came from a corporate insider.... The tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role
as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty [69].
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By reading only the first sentence, the outsider is liable because he should
know that he obtained confidential price-sensitive information from corporate
insiders. The second sentence, however, states that the tippee is not liable
unless there has been a breach by the insider. Since the insiders did not breach
any duty, there can be no derivative breach by the outsider. Thus, even the
Supreme Court has sent out conflicting signals.
A problem related to the ambiguities of the present case law is the lack of
notice to market participants. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act contains
greatly increased penalties for violations. If these punitive damages are to be
fairly applied, then traders should have notice of what constitutes a violation.
In Newman, the district court, after reviewing the historical development of
rule 10b-5, concluded that "there was no clear and definite statement in the
federal securities laws that proscribed the acts alleged" [70]. Section 10(b) is
operative only to the extent that the SEC has adopted rules "necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors" [71]. Rule
10b-5 does not, however, define any specific practices. Because the rule does
not proscribe specific acts, criminal proceedings should not be brought, and if
brought, should not be upheld by the courts unless the particular practice that
is the subject of the prosecution was one that had clearly been proscribed by
the courts or by SEC administrative proceedings at the time of the alleged
actions by the defendant [72].
The role of market analysts is also unclear. Congress has recognized that
"market professionals contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession
of nonpublic information" [73]. Analysts such as Dirks perform a valuable
function by seeking information which contributes to market efficiency in
pricing that would not otherwise be available to the general investing public
[74].
When an analyst acquires nonpublic informition not by virtue of any
insider status, but through the lawful exercise of his own diligence, and when
the information involved would not soon have been revealed to the market in
the natural course of events, the analyst ought to be permitted to trade or
advise without making a public disclosure or assuming the risk of liability [75].
Neither the Supreme Court nor the SEC have developed standards that allow
analysts any confidence that their activities will not later be deemed unlawful
[76]. Without a definition articulating the proscribed conduct, legitimate traders
and analysts might limit their trading because of fear of violating rule 10b-5.
These market participants, acting on legitimate information, should profit from
their diligence and superior skills without the risk of penalty. Absent a clear
definition of the conduct to which the Act applies, legitimate activity may be
forsaken, and heavy compliance costs incurred, all ultimately borne by the
investing public [781.
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4.2. Rule lOb-5 is inappropriate for the regulation of insider trading
The implication of the previous subsection is that rule 10b-5 does not
provide adequate guidance to the courts, the SEC, and participants in the
securities markets as to what conduct is proscribed with regard to using
nonpublic price-sensitive information. The reason for the ambiguities is that
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are general antifraud provisions with no explicit
mention of insider trading. The prohibition on the use of market information is
a judicially-created concept not based on the wording of the statute and the
rule. This judicial interpretation is inappropriate because it focuses attention
on the traditional elements of common law fraud rather than on the policies
for regulating the use of nonpublic price-sensitive information.
The courts have interpreted section 10(b) as proscribing fraud by corporate
insiders and those who knowingly trade on information received from insiders
who have breached their duty to their corporation and its shareholders.
Outsider trading on inside information, however, is not fraud because the
traditional elements of fraud - duty, misrepresentation, and deception - are
absent. The prohibition on outsider trading based on inside information is
rather a judicially-created concept, grounded more on notions of fairness than
on the specific activities outlined by section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 [79]. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has circumscribed the use of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 in the context of outsider trading. As noted by the Chiarella court,
"section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches
must be fraud" [80].
In Chiarella, the court argued clearly and persuasively that no fraud
occurred as required under section 10(b), stating that "when an allegation of
fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to
speak.... A duty to disclose under 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information" [81]. Although the decision may
be correct if read with respect to rule 10b-5, it is not convincing if analyzed in
the context of insider trading. The duty analysis is not compatible with the
impersonal marketplace where there are no face-to-face dealings between
buyers and sellers.
Further confusion in applying the duty analysis was evident in the Newman
decision. In that case, the Second Circuit held that the defendants breached a
duty to their investment bank employer and the bank's offeror clients by
trading in the targets' securities, even though there was no pre-existing duty or
other link between the defendants and the selling shareholders of the targets
[82]. The immediate injury resulting from the breach of that duty, however,
was not to the investment bank, but to the clients, whose impending tender
offer was affected by the insider trading. This situation is troublesome because
it is not clear whether employees, by virtue of their employment relationship,
acquire the firn's confidential relationship with its client. While employees
292
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may have a separate duty to their employers not to take advantage of their
employment, it is questionable whether the duty also extends to the clients so
as to impose liability under rule 10b-5 [83]. That the analysis can depend on
whether the client is a target or offeror is also problematic because violation of
section 10(b) would depend on the identity of the particular client. That is true
despite the fact that the trading of each has both the identical perceived
unfairness and identical effects on the market and should be considered
equally reprehensible [84].
The O'Conner case best exemplifies the difficulty of applying a duty analysis
to the marketplace because of its holding that a separate duty exists to disclose
or abstain that is "owed to the investing public" [85]. This duty was distinct
from the fiduciary duty owed to the corporation and its shareholders not to
profit from the use of inside information. The separate duty created in
O'Conner to the investing public is overbroad and incompatible with the
narrow holding of Chiarella, yet it is a manifestation of the desire for a new
standard. The standard of liability applied in this case, although based on the
fiduciary duty analysis, is indistinguishable from the market information
analysis [86].
4.3. The definition of insider trading should incorporate the market information
theory and reject the fiduciary duty approach
While the increased sanctions of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act are a
potent response to the problem of insider trading, the new legislation also
should contain a definition of insider trading. The cases show the need to
clarify the underlying policies of the prohibition, to set forth who is prohibited
from trading, and to define what information cannot be used by traders. A
basic problem with the case law under rule 10b-5 is that the opinions only
briefly touch upon the ongoing debates ov'er the rationale for prohibiting
insider trading and the considerations of economic efficiency. Rather than
grappling with these difficult issues, the courts instead have relied on the fraud
provisions of section 10(b). Instead of asking what legal rule would enhance
the efficiency of the markets or seeking ways to insure the markets' integrity,
the courts have relied entirely on formalistic notions of "fiduciary duty" and
"special relationship" [87]. However, these common law formulas, based upon
a norm of face-to-face dealings, are simply "unsuited to an institutional,
anonymous marketplace such as the New York Stock Exchange" [88].
In formulating the definition of insider trading, Congress should recognize
the realities of insider trading in an anonymous market and adopt the market
information theory [89]. Two fundamental tenets of securities regulation sug-
gest this approach. First, unequal information equals money. An investor with
price-sensitive information will always make a profit or avoid a loss to the
detriment of an investor without that information. Second, as the SEC has
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observed, one of the primary objectives of the Exchange Act was to restore and
maintain investor confidence in the capital markets [90]. This sense of integrity
and fairness cannot be achieved if the system condones transactions in which
one party has price-sensitive information which is not available to others. If
individual or small noninstitutional investors perceive the lack of equal oppor-
tunity, they will lose confidence in the fairness of the market and withdraw
their capital. The result would be a reduction in investor confidence in the
securities markets, which in turn would reduce the markets' depth and liquid-
ity.
As indicated previously, a definition of insider trading based on the
fiduciary duty standard makes little sense with respect to insider trading on
impersonal markets. Instead, Congress should define insider trading based on
the underlying policies of the securities acts: preservation of the liquidity,
efficiency and fairness of the U.S. securities markets. Achievement of these
policies requires adoption of a market information approach in defining
insider trading.
The lack of precision associated with the duty analysis "is a burden on law
enforcement and on society in general" [90]. The courts and the SEC are
sending conflicting messages to the marketplace. In order for the SEC to
effectively regulate the market, it must have effective tools with the imprimatur
of Congress. The SEC has expressed fears that a new standard would create
uncertainty and would not provide sufficient flexibility to attack unforeseeable
trading devices [91]. Although any definition would incorporate new terms and
concepts which would have to be interpreted in subsequent litigation, a
properly drafted statute would provide the courts and the SEC with a suffi-
cient framework in which to deal with present and future abuses [92]. The
solution to this problem is legislation specifically addressing the issue of
outsider trading [93].
Great Britain recently adopted a comprehensive insider trading statute
based on the market information theory. Congress should look closely at this
law as a guide to adopting a modern definition as part of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act.
5. The British definition of insider trading in the Companies Act of 1980
Prior to the enactment of the Companies Act 1980 ("the 1980 Act") [94],
only limited attempts were made to prohibit insider trading in Great Britain.
Before 1980, the London Stock Exchange and the City Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers could sanction members or disgorge profits made through insider
trading and return them to the company which had been the object of the
takeover attempt. These remedies, however, lacked the authority of law so that
no truly effective penalty was possible [95]. These forms of self-regulation were
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so ineffective that one commentator referred to insider trading as being
"virtually legal in Britain" until the adoption of the 1980 Act [96].
The 1980 Act made significant changes in the corporate law of Great
Britain. It implements the European Economic Community Second Directive
on Company Law [97], expands regulations on director conflicts of interest,
requires directors to consider employee interests, facilitates minority share-
holder access to the courts, and prohibits insider dealing. Much of the Act,
including Part V on insider dealing, was proposed in earlier Companies Bills in
1973 and 1978 which were not enacted [98].
Great Britain decided to prohibit insider trading for many of the same
reasons articulated in the United States. The securities industry and Parliament
believed that widespread insider dealing threatened public confidence in the
securities markets, as well as in directors and others closely associated with
companies. One Member of Parliament summed up the problem: "Insider
dealing is wrong" [99]. It was hoped that the new law, containing only criminal
sanctions, would "represent a fair and reasonable balance between deterring
wrongdoers and not discouraging those who are doing no wrong at all" [1001.
The 1980 Act, in sections 68-73, deals with insider trading (termed "insider
dealing") on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information. Under
section 72, an insider dealing violation is punishable by a conviction of up to
two years, a fine, or both [101]. Section 73 defines unpublished price-sensitive
information as that which:
(a) relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or indirectly) to that company, that is
to say, is not of general nature relating or of concern to that company; and (b) is not generally
known to those persons who are accustomed or would be likely to deal in those securities but
would, if it were generally known to them. be likely materially to affect the price of those securities
11021.
The statute regulates the behavior of four groups of individuals. The first
group includes those connected with a company (insiders). The term "con-
nected with a company" is defined in section 73(a) [103] and individuals falling
within the definition have duties not to trade as described in sections 68(1-2)
[104]. Additionally, under sections 68(6-7), such individuals are prohibited
from tipping information to those who may trade on the basis of such
information [105] or who may pass such information to others [106]. These
prohibitions are limited by the exceptions contained in sections 68(8) [107] and
68(10) [108].
The second group are those individuals contemplating or having contem-
plated a takeover offer. Subject to the exceptions in sections 68(8) and 68(10)
[109], such individuals are prohibited from dealing in the securities of that
company to the extent defined in section 68(4) [110] and from tipping the
information described in section 68(6-7) [111].
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Tippees are the third group regulated by the statute. Under section 68(3)
[1121, tippees may not trade on the basis of information obtained from certain
individuals connected with a company. Under section 68(5) [113], tippees of
certain individuals contemplating or having contemplated a takeover offer are
prohibited from trading. Once again, sections 68(8) and 68(10) [114] limit
tippees' liability. Finally, the fourth group regulated by the Act are Crown
servants. Under section 69 [115], Crown servants are prohibited from trading
on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information or from tipping that
information to others.
The only case brought before a Crown Court for insider trading under the
1980 Act resulted in convictions for the two defendants. In the Titheridge [116]
case, a case not unlike Chiarella, Mrs. Titheridge, a secretary at a merchant
bank, learned of an impending takeover and passed the information to her
husband, an employee at another merchant bank, who then purchased shares
for both his own account and for a client. Mr. Titheridge was charged with
secondary insider dealing under section 68(3) and counselling or procuring
under section 68(6), and his wife was charged with the latter offense. Both
pleaded guilty and were fined £4000 each. The judge was critical of their
conduct, stating that "others must be deterred from doing similar things,
because the mischief of offenses of this type tend, quite wrongly, to put the
integrity of the entire City at risk" [117]. One noted authority applauded the
judge's stem attitude since the judge correctly identified the primary justifica-
tion for seeking to regulate insider dealing - the preservation and maintenance
of investor confidence [1181.
A detailed critique of the insider dealing provisions in the Companies Act of
1980 is beyond the scope of this comment [119]. Only one case has been
decided under the 1980 Act, and the British courts are left to resolve a number
of ambiguities in applying the statutory language.
For example, would an individual be liable under section 68(3) for purchas-
ing stock in a company after being counselled to do so by an insider if the
tippee was not given the reasons underlying the advice? Clearly, the insider
would be liable for counselling or procuring under section 68(6). Whether the
tippee would be liable under section 68(3), however, is more problematic.
Under that section, the tippee would have to be deemed to have received
unpublished price-sensitive information and would have to know or have
reasonable cause to believe that it was unreasonable for the insider to disclose
the information except in the proper performance of his duties. It is not clear
whether a tip simply to buy stock without disclosure of the underlying reasons
represents unpublished price-sensitive information under section 72.
Despite the ambiguities of the statutory language, however, the insider
trading provisions of the 1980 Act have two advantages over insider trading
regulation within the United States. First, by providing a definition of insider
trading, instead of using a broad antifraud statute, Parliament has given more
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extensive and clearer notice to the courts, to the administrative agencies
charged with regulating the securities markets, and to the investing public as to
what constitutes a violation. Second, by adopting a market information ap-
proach to insider trading, Parliament has avoided the troublesome fiduciary
duty analysis. As this comment has argued, the fiduciary duty analysis is
ambiguous, is subject to maniulation by the courts, and ignores the realities of
the securities markets.
6. Conclusion
The SEC faces a number of difficulties in enforcing the prohibition on
insider trading within the U.S. securities markets. Problems of detection,
investigation, and identification of abusers, as well as limited resources,
militate against the SEC ever totally eradicating insider trading. The Supreme
Court's Chiarella and Dirks decisions also are problematic because they
rejected the market information theory of insider trading, adopting instead the
more narrow and ambiguous fiduciary duty theory. While the SEC still can
bring the "hard-core" cases, its efforts to curtail tipping and to enhance the
integrity of the marketplace may be considerably weakened by these two
decisions [1201.
The proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983 offers Congress the
opportunity to amend the Exchange Act to include a much needed definition
of insider trading. This definition should be predicated on the market informa-
tion theory rather than the fiduciary duty theory. Toward this end, the
definition of insider trading contained in the British Companies Act of 1980
should provide guidance to Congress.
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[1031
(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, an individual is connected with a company if.
but only if, -
(a) he is a director of that company or a related company; or
(b) he occupies a position as an officer (other than director) or employee of that company
or a related company or a position involving a professional or business relationship
between himself (or his employer or a company of which he is a director) and the first
company or a related company which in either case may reasonably be expected to give
him access to information which, in relation to securities of either company, is unpub-
lished price sensitive information, and which it would be reasonable to expect a person in
his position not to disclose except for the proper performance of his functions.
1980 Act, section 73(1).
[1041
(1) Subject to subsection (8) below, an individual who is. or at any time in the preceding
six months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised
stock exchange in securities of that company if he has information which -
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company;
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected and in the position by virtue of
which he is so connected not to disclose except for the proper performance of the
functions attaching to that position; and
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.
(2) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is, or at any time in the
preceding six months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a
recognised stock exchange in securities of any 6ther company if he has information which
(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the first company;
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected and in the position by virtue of
which he is so connected not to disclose except for the proper performance of the
functions attaching to that position;
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities of
that other company; and
(d) relates to any transaction (actual or contemplated) involving both the first company
and that other company or involving one of them and securities of the other or to the fact
that such transaction is no longer contemplated.
Id. at sections 68(1), (2).
[105] (6) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is for the time being
prohibited by any provision of this section from dealing on a recognised stock exchange in
any securities shall not counsel or procure any other person to deal in those securities.
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that that person would deal in them on a
recognised stock exchange.
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Id. at section 68(6).
[106] (7) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is for the time being
prohibited as aforesaid from dealing on a recognised stock exchange in any securities by
reason of his having any information, shall not communicate that information to any other
person if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that that or some other person will
make use of the information for the purpose of dealing, or of counselling or procuring any
other person to deal, on a recognised stock exchange in those securities.
Id. at section 68(7).
[1071
(8) The provisions of this section shall not prohibit an individual by reason of his having
any information from -
(a) doing any particular thing otherwise than with a view to the making of a profit or the
avoidance of a loss (whether for himself or another person) by the use of that information;
(b) entering into a transaction in the course of the exercise in good faith of his functions as
liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy; or
(c) doing any particular thing if the information -
(i) was obtained by him in the course of a business of a jobber in which he was engaged or
employed; and
(ii) was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him to obtain in the
ordinary course of that business; and he does that thing in good faith in the course of that
business.
Id. at section 68(8).
[109] See supra notes 107-108.
[110]
(4) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where an individual is contemplating, or has
contemplated, making, whether with or without another person, a takeover offer for a
company in a particular capacity, that individual shall not deal on a recognised stock
exchange in securities of that company in another capacity if he knows that information
that the offer is contemplated or is no longer contemplated is unpublished price sensitive
information in relation to those securities.
1980 Act at § 68(4).
[111] See supra notes 105-106.
[112]
(3) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where -
(a) any individual has information which he knowingly obtained (directly or indirectly)
from another individual who is connected with a particular company, or was at any time in
the six months preceding the obtaining of the information so connected and who the
former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe held the information by virtue
of being so connected; and
(b) the former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that, because of the
latter's connection and position, it would be reasonable to expect him not to disclose the
information except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position;
then, the former individual -
(i) shall not himself deal on a recognised exchange in securities of that company if he
knows that the information is unpublished price sensitive
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(ii) shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of any other
company if he knows that the information is unpublished price sensitive information in
relation to those securities and it relates to any transaction (actual or contemplated)
involving the first company and the other company or involving one of them and securities
of the other or to the fact that any such transaction is no longer contemplated.
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(5) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where an individual has knowingly obtained
(directly or indirectly), from an individual to whom subsection (4) above applies, informa-
tion that the offer referred to in subsection (4) is being contemplated or is no longer
contemplated. the former individual shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange
in securities of that company if he knows that the information is unpublished price
sensitive information in relation to those securities.
1980 Act at section 68 (5).
Id. at section 68(3).
[114] See supra notes 107-108.
[115]
(1) This section applies to any information which -
(a) is held by a Crown servant or former Crown servant by virtue of his position or former
position as a Crown servant or is knowingly obtained by an individual (directly or
indirectly) from a Crown servant or former Crown servant who he knows or has
reasonable cause to believe held the information by virtue of any such position;
(b) it would be reasonable to expect an individual in the position of the Crown servant or
former position of the former Crown servant not to disclose except for the proper
performance of the functions attaching to that position; and
(c) the individual holding it knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to
securities of a particular company (relevant securities).
(2) This section applies to a Crown servant or former Crown servant holding information
to which this section applies and to any individual who knowingly obtained any such
information (directly or indirectly) from a Crown servant or former Crown servant who
that individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe held the information by virtue of
his position or former position as a Crown servant.
1980 Act at section 69.
[116] Croydon Crown Court, Dec. 17, 1982 (unreported), noted in 4 Co. Law. 117 (1983).
1117] 4 Co. Law. 117 (1983).
1118] Id. (quoting B.A.K. Rider (British securities expert)).
[1191 See Ashe, Companies Act 1980-1, 130 New LJ. 672, 674 (1980); see Note, The Companies
Act 1980: Its Effects on British Corporate Law, 4 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 551 (1982); Hawes,
Lee and Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An International Analysis. 14 Law &
Pol'y. Int'l. Bus. 335 (1982); Lee, supra note 102.
[1201 Poser, supra note 67, at 1270; Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967
Wise. L. Rev. 720, 737 n. 81 (arguing that "the' unfairness' would appear substantially the
same from the standpoint of an outsider who deals with an informed trader" regardless of
the source of the inside information); see also Note, Rationalizing Liability for Non-dis-
closure Under lOb-5: Equal Access to Information in United States v. Chiarella, 1980 Wis.
L. Rev. 163.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
